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LIBERTY, THE "LAW OF THE LAND," AND
ABORTION IN NORTH CAROLINA
Louis D. BILIoNIs*
Does the North Carolina Constitution safeguard a woman's right to
make "the highly personal choice whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy"?'
There has been no definitive ruling from the state courts, so this
interesting question2 may be admitted as open. If women in North Caro-
lina should ever need to enlist the state constitution in their effort to
retain control of the abortion decision, however, they will discover text,
precedent, principle, and tradition to support them. This essay makes no
attempt to brief the case for abortion rights under the North Carolina
Constitution in detail; there will be time and lawyers enough for that if
the need arises? It does spotlight, however, two critical premises of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A.B. 1979,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. 1982, Harvard University.
1. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 420 n.1 (1983).
2. In recent years, several profitable inquiries into state constitutional law's potential to
protect abortion rights have been undertaken. See, e.g., Michael R. Braudes, State Constitu-
tional Regulation of Abortion, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 497 (1990); John Devlin, Privacy and
Abortion Rights Under the Louisiana State Constitution: Could Roe v. Wade be Alive and Well
in the Bayou State?, 51 LA. L. REV. 685 (1991); Amy Johnson, Abortion, Personhood, and
Privacy in Texas, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1521 (1990); Janice Steinschneider, State Constitutions: The
New Battlefield for Abortion Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 284 (1987); Darin E. Tweedt,
The Validity of Legislative Restrictions on Abortion Under the Oregon Constitution, 65 TEMPLE
L. REV. 1349 (1992); Kimberley A. Chaput, Comment, Abortion Rights Under State Constitu-
tions: Fighting the Abortion War in the State Courts, 70 OR. L. REV. 593 (1991); Martha M.
Ezzard, Comment, State Constitutional Privacy Rights Post Webster-Broader Protection
Against Abortion Restrictions?, 67 DENV. U. L. REV. 401 (1990); see also Ken Gormley &
Rhonda G. Hartman, Privacy and the States, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 1279 (1992) (examining case
law interpreting state constitutional privacy rights); J. Clark Kelso, California's Constitutional
Right to Privacy, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 327 (1992) (examining privacy law under the California
Constitution); Timothy Stallcup, Comment, The Arizona Constitutional "'Right to Privacy" and
the Invasion of Privacy Tort, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 687 (1992) (surveying Arizona's privacy law).
3. Several factors operate to make it unlikely that the Supreme Court of North Carolina
will have to face the question directly any time soon. First, if past patterns persist, anti-abor-
tion proposals should fare poorly in the North Carolina General Assembly, foreclosing the
occasion for a state constitutional challenge. See Rachele Kanigel, Odd Mix Creates Liberal
N.C. Abortion Laws, NEvS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 4, 1992, at 1A, 12A ("In the
past eight years, legislators opposed to abortion have proposed nearly a dozen bills that would
have put restrictions on abortion. Despite sometimes considerable legislative support, none of
them passed the General Assembly."). Second, there is the possibility that Congress might
enact legislation to protect abortion rights, thereby removing the issue from the state political
arena. Third, there is the possibility that scrutiny under the Federal Constitution pursuant to
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North Carolina constitutional law which any respectable inquiry into the
state constitutional status of abortion rights in North Carolina must ac-
cept as given. Properly understood, they point in favor of a broadly pro-
tective right of choice.
I. THE BREADTH OF CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED LIBERTY IN
NORTH CAROLINA
One objection commonly raised against the constitutionalization of
abortion rights is that such action requires an impermissible extratextual
excursion on the part of the courts.4 Whatever the strength of that argu-
ment at the federal level-it was decisively rejected by a majority of the
United States Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,5 and its theoretical premises have consistently
proved unavailing in the high court6-- it is difficult to see any merit in it
under the North Carolina Constitution. Simply put, a woman's interest
in retaining authority over the decision whether to carry her pregnancy
to term falls comfortably within the ambit of personal "liberty" secured
by the North Carolina Declaration of Rights.7 The provisions of the
Declaration of Rights relevant to the inquiry are section 1,8 which reads:
We hold it to be self-evident that all persons are created equal;
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
rights; that among these are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the
fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of happiness[;]
and section 19, 9 which in pertinent part provides:
the standards set forth in Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992),
might resolve some questions in favor of abortion rights and thus obviate the need to address
the state constitution.
4. See, eg., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2858-60 (Rehnquist, C.., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (advocating, for such reasons, that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), should be overruled); id. at 2873-75 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (same).
5. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804-16 (1992).
6. See id. at 2804-06 (affirming the validity of unenumerated rights jurisprudence under
the Due Process Clause; rejecting the hypothesis that the clause "protects only those practices,
defined at the most specific level, that were protected against government interference by other
rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified"; referring to the hypothesis ad-
vanced by Justice Scalia in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (opinion
of Scalia, J.)); Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, 3., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring in
part) (rejecting Scalia's position); id. at 136-47, 156-57 (Brennan, I., joined by Marshall, J.,
and Blackmun, J., dissenting) (same).
7. The consequences of this conclusion-in particular, the amount of protection to be
afforded this liberty interest by the courts in the name of the state constitution-is quite an-
other matter, and one to which we will turn in Part II of this essay.
8. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1.
9. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 19.
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No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his free-
hold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any
manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law
of the land.
To say that a woman has a "liberty" interest in retaining authority
over procreative and childbearing matters, including abortion, surely
does no violence to the plain language of these provisions. "Liberty" is a
spacious term standing alone, and it is made no less so when used in
conjunction with other more or less commodious constructs like "privi-
leges," "property," "the enjoyment of the fruits of [one's] own labor,"
and "the pursuit of happiness." As the United States Supreme Court has
established in cases from Roe v. Wade0 to Casey, and as some of North
Carolina's sister states likewise have demonstrated through decisions ren-
dered under their own constitutions,"1 the concept of constitutional lib-
erty easily embraces the personal interest underlying abortion rights.
Nor will the stock rejoinder, original intent,12 disturb this conclu-
sion. The founders in question are the people of North Carolina who
ratified the current state constitution, North Carolina's third, in 1970.13
When they reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of sections 1
and 19 twenty-three years ago,14 the people endorsed texts with an estab-
lished interpretive understanding. By the time of North Carolina's latest
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. See, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Supp. 394, 449-50, 515 A.2d 134, 162 (Super. Ct.
1986) (relying, inter alia, on state constitutional guarantee of due process, pursuant to CONN.
CONST. art. I, § 10, to invalidate limits on state funding of abortion to cases involving danger
to the life of the mother); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 654-55, 417
N.E.2d 387, 402 (1981) (relying on the state constitutional guarantee of due process to invali-
date limits on state funding of abortion to cases involving danger to the life of the mother);
Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 310, 450 A.2d 925, 937 (1982) (relying on N.J. CONST.
art. I, par. 1, which is similar to N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1, to invalidate limits on state funding of
abortion to cases involving danger to the life of the mother); Hope v. Perales, 150 Misc. 2d
985, 994-97, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972, 978-80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (relying, inter alia, on state consti-
tutional guarantee of due process, pursuant to N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6, to invalidate limits on
state funding of abortion to cases involving danger to the life of the mother).
12. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUC-
TION OF THE LAW 143, 158-59, 169-70 (1990) (espousing "the original understanding" as the
sole theory of constitutional interpretation that can reconcile judicial review and democracy,
and arguing for the overruling of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as unsupportable by
original intent).
13. Voters adopted the current North Carolina Constitution in 1970; it became effective in
July 1971. For a discussion of the import of the 1970 ratification and of the circumstances
surrounding it, see John V. Orth, North Carolina Constitutional History, 70 N.C. L. REv.
1759, 1789-91 (1992) [hereinafter Orth, Constitutional History].
14. Section 1 was first received into the state's organic law with the ratification of the 1868
constitution. See N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 1; see also John V. Orth, Tuesday, February
11, 1868: The Day North Carolina Chose Direct Election of Judges, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1825,
1844-45 n.27 (1992) (discussing the adoption of language now appearing in § 1). Section 19
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constitutional founding, it was long and firmly settled that liberty is a
designedly open-ended and capacious constitutional expression-a term
to be interpreted expansively to encompass those newly discernible as-
pects of personal freedom that emerge in an ever-evolving society.
This point should not pass without full appreciation. Consider the
following exposition on the breadth of constitutional liberty from the
1949 decision in State v. Ballance, " a leading case in the North Carolina
Supreme Court's substantive due process oeuvre under the state
constitution:
These fundamental guaranties, [sections 1 and 19,] are very
broad in scope, and are intended to secure to each person sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the State extensive individual rights,
including that of personal liberty. The term "liberty," as used
in these constitutional provisions, does not consist simply of the
right to be free from arbitrary physical restraint or servitude,
but is "deemed to embrace the right of man to be free in the
enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been endowed by
his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for
the common welfare .... It includes the right of the citizen to
be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to
pursue any livelihood or vocation, and for that purpose to enter
into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential
to his carrying out these purposes to successful conclusion."' 6
When Justice Ervin penned that testimonial to liberty, he was not
writing on a clean slate. Undoubtedly, he was aware of Justice Seawell's
declaration nearly a decade earlier, in the pivotal case of State v. Harris, 7
that there "is a fundamental canon o[f] construction that a Constitution
should receive a liberal interpretation in favor of a citizen, especially with
respect to those provisions which were designed to safeguard the liberty
and security of the citizen in regard to both person and property."'" The
may be traced to the state's original Declaration of Rights; for a discussion of § 19's origins,
see Orth, Constitutional History, supra note 13, at 1766.
15. 229 N.C. 764, 767, 51 S.E.2d 731, 732 (1949) (invalidating, under what now are cited
as §§ 1 and 19, legislation requiring licensing of photographers), overruling State v. Lawrence,
213 N.C. 674, 197 S.E. 586 (1938).
16. Id. at 769, 51 S.E.2d at 734 (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted).
17. 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940) (invalidating legislation requiring licensing of dry
cleaners). See infra text accompanying notes 45-51 for a discussion of the Harris decision's
significant place in the history of substantive due process adjudication under the North Caro-
lina Constitution.
18. Harris, 216 N.C. at 764-65, 6 S.E.2d at 866 (quoting 11 AM. JUR. § 59, at 670 (1937)).
Justice Ervin thought the decision in Ballance was controlled by the "well considered holding"
of Harris. Ballance, 229 N.C. at 767, 51 S.E.2d at 733.
[Vol. 711842
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year before Harris, Justice Seawell authored the opinion in Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Saunders,9 wherein he offered a hearty defense of the principle
that liberty must be read expansively:
It is as little as we can do, out of respect to [the Declaration of
Rights'] framers, and the obvious purposes of such an instru-
ment, to regard it as a forward-looking document, anticipating
economic as well as political conditions yet to emerge. It is not
a statute. Its concepts worthy of surviving are fundamentally
stated and must be sufficiently generic and comprehensive to
allow adjustment to the current needs of humanity. In this way
only can we interpret it in terms of social justice so necessary to
maintain its usefulness and to continue it in the public
respect.20
Similar thoughts may be found in cases of older vintage, handed
down before it had become unfashionable to speak of unenumerated con-
stitutional freedoms as matters of "higher law." In State v. Darnell,2' a
unanimous 1914 decision invalidating a racially restrictive housing ordi-
nance enacted by the Town of Winston, the justices had no difficulty with
the notion that these provisions protect rights "not conferred by the Con-
stitution, but exist[ing] of natural right."'22 This merely echoed Justice
Douglas' turn-of-the-century observation in State ex rel. Wilson v. Jor-
dan 3 that section 1 "is an express declaration that there remain in the
citizen certain inherent rights that are independent even of constitutional
recognition."' 4 The justice understandably thought this conclusion was
fortified by the assertion elsewhere in the Declaration of Rights that
"[t]he enumeration of rights in this Article shall not be construed to im-
pair or deny others retained by the people."' 25 Justice Douglas did not
gild the lily by stressing a semantic feature of section 1 that would seem
19. 216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939) (upholding North Carolina Fair Trade Act against
state constitutional challenge), overruled by Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs. of N. Wilkes-
boro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 206 S.E.2d 141 (1974).
20. Id. at 176, 4 S.E.2d at 537.
21. 166 N.C. 300, 81 S.E. 338 (1914).
22. Id. at 304, 81 S.E. at 340.
23. 124 N.C. 683, 33 S.E. 139 (1899). The case involved an application of the rule estab-
lished in Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. (1 Dev.) 1, 18-19 (1833), overruled by Mial v. Ellington,
134 N.C. 131, 46 S.E. 961 (1903), that a public office holder enjoys a property right in the
office which could not be withdrawn by legislative action. See infra notes 40-44.
24. Jordan, 124 N.C. at 719, 33 S.E. at 147 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas
was evidently impressed by the natural law underpinnings of the North Carolina Constitu-
tion's protection of individual liberties. See State v. Hay, 126 N.C. 999, 1006, 35 S.E. 459, 462
(1900) (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that § 1 "does not profess to confer these rights, but
recognizes them as pre-existing and inherent in the individual by 'Right Divine' ").
25. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 36; see Jordan, 124 N.C. at 719, 33 S.E. at 147 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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to bolster his argument. By its own terms, section 1 does not purport to
delineate exhaustively the "inalienable rights" of the people, but instead
recites only a few of the more notable "among" them. 6
These being the sentiments of the original intent behind the concept
of constitutional liberty under sections 1 and 19-sentiments, it might be
added, that have been reiterated in contemporary cases 27---it is neither
surprising nor consequential that the people of North Carolina have re-
frained from amending their constitution to specify a right of privacy or
personal autonomy.28 North Carolinians have not been immune from
the peculiar American urge to amend state constitutions.29 They have,
however, generally resisted the temptation to tinker with their Declara-
tion of Rights and instead have directed most of their modifications to
the document's political and governmental provisions.3" "[B]y far the
26. See Louis D. Bilionis, On the Significance of Constitutional Spirit, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1803, 1823-24 n.70 (1992) (discussing how the language of § 1, in conjunction with N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 36, supports a jurisprudence of unenumerated fundamental rights).
27. See, e.g., Corum v. University of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 783, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (1992)
("We give our Constitution a liberal interpretation in favor of its citizens with respect to those
provisions which were designed to safeguard the liberty and security of the citizens in regard to
both person and property.") (citing State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940)); Kiser
v. Kiser, 325 N.C. 502, 510, 385 S.E.2d 487, 491 (1989) (noting that the "great ordinances" of
the state constitution-those relating to individual rights-merit liberal interpretation, in con-
trast to provisions of a structural nature); Stan v. State, 47 N.C. App. 209, 216-17, 267 S.E.2d
335, 341 (1980) ("[O]ur State Constitution is an organic document, and.., interpretation of
its language is subject to change to include new things and new conditions of the same class as
those specified which were not known or contemplated when it was adopted."), affd in part
and rev'd in part on other grounds, 302 N.C. 357, 275 S.E.2d 439 (1981).
28. Five states amended their state constitutions between 1972 and 1980 to add express
language protecting a right to privacy over personal decisions. See ALASKA CONST. art. I,
§ 22 ("The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed."); CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."); FLA. CONsT. art. I,
§ 23 ("Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion
into his private life except as otherwise provided herein."); HAW. CoiqsT. art. I, § 6 ("The
right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a
compelling state interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this right.");
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 ("The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a
free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.");
Gormley & Hartman, supra note 2, at 1282-83 (discussing these amendments to state constitu-
tions, as well as amendments relating to privacy in the search and seizure context).
29. See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills of Rights,
54 Miss. L.J. 223, 233-56 (1984) (noting the spate of recent amendments to state constitutional
bills of rights and surveying examples); see also James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of
State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 761, 819-21 (1992) (pointing to the frequent
amendment of state constitutions as a sign that such documents are unlikely sources of funda-
mental values).
30. See Orth, Constitutional History, supra note 13, at 1781-83, 1791, 1795. As a practical
matter, of course, there had been no need to amend the Declaration in these respects so long as
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most stable provisions of North Carolina's organic law," John Orth
noted in these pages a year ago, "have been those safeguards of due pro-
cess expressed in the declaration of rights, now Article I. '31 This com-
mendable sign of constitutional maturity is attributable, at least in part,
to the Declaration's generality, its abstractness, and its capacity for
growth through the process of judicial review.32
II. THE "LAW OF THE LAND," JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND THE
NORTH CAROLINA TRADITION OF HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
One rightly may question how long an all-encompassing vision of
constitutional liberty would last if the courts took verbatim section l's
observance that the freedoms it recognizes are "inalienable." Were every
governmental intrusion upon a liberty interest subject to a judicial decla-
ration of unconstitutionality, the concept of liberty under section 1 surely
would be rethought and somehow narrowed; courts are loath to deny,
after all, that a civilized society must make some demands upon its citi-
zenry to advance the greater good. But rather than narrow the range of
liberty interests entitled to constitutional protection-standing at the
threshold of the Declaration of Rights, granting admission to those inter-
ests thought desirable and denying entry to the rest-North Carolina has
underemphasized the word "inalienable" and accented, instead, section
19's recognition that liberty may be infringed, provided the infringement
is accomplished "by the law of the land."33
Adherence to the "law of the land," however, means much more
than compliance with the formal dictates of the legislative process. 34
Since very early in their state's constitutional history, North Carolinians
have understood the safeguards of the "law of the land" to include the
protections of a rigorous, yet responsible, judicial review. In the modern
argot, this is akin to the heightened judicial scrutiny of official action
associated with substantive due process jurisprudence under the federal
the federal courts held resolute in their support of abortion rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
31. Id. at 1795.
32. Id. at 1762.
33. E.g., State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 755, 6 S.E.2d 854, 861 (1940) (noting that the
concept of constitutional liberty does not confer upon the individual an "absolute right to
choose and pursue any occupation he pleases, regardless of the public interest"); London v.
Headen, 76 N.C. 72, 74-75 (1877) (noting that liberty is not absolute, and may be infringed
consistent with the "law of the land").
34. Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. (1 Dev.) 1, 15 (1833) ("Those terms 'law of the land' do
not mean merely an act of the General Assembly. If they did, every restriction upon the
legislative authority would be at once abrogated."), overruled on other grounds by Mial v.
Ellington, 134 N.C. 131, 46 S.E. 961 (1903).
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Due Process Clause.35 The seeds of the doctrine were planted in Bayard
v. Singleton,3 6 the landmark 1787 case establishing the legitimacy of judi-
cial enforcement of the state constitution as against legislative will.3 7
The seeds held fast in Trustees of the University of North Carolina v.
Foy,38 despite a strong plea for deference to the people's elected repre-
sentatives, 39 as well as in Hoke v. Henderson,4' an 1833 decision whose
well-developed defense of judicial review remains instructive even though
its formal holding has long since been abandoned.4 The answer to the
charge that judicial review is anti-democratic, Chief Justice Ruffin rea-
soned in Hoke, lies in the court's obligations to the principle of popular
sovereignty.42 When a court scrutinizes governmental action under the
35. It is often said that the "law of the land," as used in § 19, is "synonymous" with due
process of law. E.g., McNeill v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552, 563, 398 S.E.2d 475, 481
(1990); Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs. of N.Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 474, 206
S.E.2d 141, 146 (1974). This does not mean, however, that the due process decisions of the
United States Supreme Court demarcate the full meaning of the "law of the land." The North
Carolina Supreme Court repeatedly has made clear that the scope of the "law of the land"
clause raises a question of state constitutional law that must be resolved independently by the
state judiciary. E.g., McNeill, 327 N.C. at 563, 398 S.E.2d at 481; Bulova Watch, 285 N.C. at
474, 206 S.E.2d at 146; see also Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345,
351-52, 350 S.E.2d 365, 369 (1986) (noting that while the "law of the land" clause is synony-
mous with due process, the state provision may afford relief in cases where federal constitu-
tional doctrines do not), affid, 320 N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783 (1987).
36. 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5, 6-7 (1787).
37. Discussions of Bayard and its influence on the United States Supreme Court's affirma-
tion ofjudicial review in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), may be found in
James G. Exum, Jr., Rediscovering State Constitutions, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1742-45 (1992),
and John V. Orth, "Fundamental Principles" in North Carolina Constitutional History, 69 N.C.
L. RaV. 1357, 1357-58, 1363-64 (1991).
38. 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58, 87-89 (1805) (invalidating, under the "law of the land" clause,
legislation that repealed a grant to trustees of the university of "all the property that had
theretofore or should thereafter escheat to the State").
39. Id. at 89 (Hall, J., dissenting) ("[When] one branch of the Government undertak[es]
to decide whether another branch of the same Government has or has not transcended its
constitutional powers .... although a difference of opinion may sometimes exist, it will be an
honest one, and cannot fail to find its remedy in mutual tolerance and concession.... Before a
law enacted by the Legislature should be pronounced unconstitutional, it ought to appear to
the Court to be palpably so.").
40. 15 N.C. (1 Dev.) 1 (1833), overruled on other grounds by Mial v. Ellington, 134 N.C.
131, 46 S.E. 961 (1903).
41. Hoke established the curious proposition that a public office holder enjoyed a property
right in the office which could not be withdrawn by legislative action. Id. at 18-19. Applica-
tion of the rule of Hoke in State ex rel Wilson v. Jordan, 124 N.C. 683, 695, 33 S.E. 139, 142-
43 (1899), earned the state supreme court substantial political controversy and brought the
justices to the brink of removal by impeachment. Shortly thereafter, Hoke's holding was over-
ruled in Mial v. Ellington, 134 N.C. 131, 162, 46 S.E. 961, 971 (1903). For discussion of the
political history associated with Hoke, see Walter F. Pratt, Jr., The Struggle for Judicial Inde-
pendence in Antebellum North Carolina: The Story of Two Judges, 4 LAW & HiST. REV. 129,
133-48 (1986).
42. Hoke, 15 N.C. (1 Dev.) at 6-10.
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constitution, the task (properly conceived) "involves nocollateral consid-
erations of abstract justice or political expediency.14 3 To the contrary:
It depends upon the comparison of the intentions and will of
the people as expressed in the Constitution, as the fundamental
law, unalterable except by the people themselves, with the in-
tentions and wills of the agents chosen under that instrument,
to whom is confided the exercise of the powers therein dele-
gated or not prohibited. Such agents are all public servants in
this State; and the agency is necessarily subordinate to the supe-
rior authority of the Constitution, which emanated directly
from the whole people.... [W]hen the representatives pass an
act upon a subject upon which the people have said in the Con-
stitution, they shall not legislate at all; or when upon a subject
on which they are allowed to legislate, they enact that to be law
which the same instrument says shall not be the law, then it
becomes the province of those who are to expound and enforce
the laws, to determine which will, thus declared, is the law....
[A]nd if upon that comparison it be found that the act is with-
out warrant in the Constitution, and is inconsistent with the
will of the people as there declared, the Court cannot execute
the act, but must obey the superior law, given by the people
alike to their judicial and to their legislative agents.44
Such was the early faith in judicial review.45 However, in the late
1930s, when the United States Supreme Court began its retreat from the
substantive due process jurisprudence identified with Lochner v. New
York,46 there was some question whether that faith would give way to
wholesale deference to the political departments. Indeed, initial signs in-
dicated that the North Carolina Supreme Court might follow the federal
lead, as the justices upheld economic legislation of dubious distinction in
43. Id. at 6.
44. Id. at 7-8; see also State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 763, 6 S.E.2d 854, 865-66 (1940)
(advancing a similar justification for judicial review); State ex rel Wilson v. Jordan, 124 N.C.
683, 718-21, 33 S.E. 139, 146-47 (1899) (Douglas, J., concurring) (same). Readers interested
in a contemporary articulation of the theory will profit from Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty
and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987).
45. Late-19th and early-20th century cases evidencing the same faith include State v.
Moore, 113 N.C. 698, 709, 18 S.E. 342, 347 (1893) (invalidating legislation prohibiting solicita-
tion of North Carolina laborers to work out-of-state), overruled by State v. Hunt, 129 N.C.
686, 689, 40 S.E. 216, 217 (1901); State v. Hay, 126 N.C. 999, 1002-04, 35 S.E. 459, 461 (1900)
(upholding compulsory vaccination provided that exceptions are permitted where individual's
health at risk); and State v. Biggs, 133 N.C. 729, 742, 46 S.E. 401, 405 (1903) (prohibiting the
criminalization, as unauthorized practice of medicine, of provision of nonmedical natural heal-
ing methods, such as massage).
46. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The retreat was sounded in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379, 390-400 (1937).
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State v. Lawrence47 and Eli Lilly & Co. v. Saunders.48 Strident dissents in
each case, however, argued for rigorous review under the state constitu-
tion,49 and those views eventually won over the court in State v. Harris in
1940.50 Judicial review in the name of the "law of the land" blossomed
anew as the state supreme court proceeded to strike down various pieces
of economic legislation." The tradition has continued in more recent
years, with cases like In re Aston Park Inc.,2 Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand
Distributors of North Wilkesboro, Inc.," and Treants Enterprises, Inc. v.
Onslow County.5 4
Important for our purposes is not merely North Carolina's commit-
ment to judicial review as an essential means of guaranteeing liberty, but
the nature of the review that has been performed over the years. The
"law of the land," it has been said, imposes "flexible restraints ... which
are satisfied if the act in question is not 'unreasonable, arbitrary or capri-
cious, and ... [ifi the means selected ... have a real and substantial
relation to the object sought to be obtained.' ,,5 Whether a challenged
47. 213 N.C. 674, 680-81, 197 S.E. 586, 590 (1938) (upholding, against state constitu-
tional attack, regulations requiring the licensing of photographers by a trade board), overruled
by State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 767, 51 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1949).
48. 216 N.C. 163, 181-82, 4 S.E.2d 528, 540-41 (1939) (rejecting state and federal consti-
tutional challenges to North Carolina's Fair Trade Act), overruled by Bulova Watch Co. v.
Brand Distribs. of N.Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 481, 206 S.E.2d 141, 151 (1974).
49. Eli Lilly, 216 N.C. at 182-97, 4 S.E.2d at 541-50 (Barnhill, J., dissenting); Lawrence,
213 N.C. at 681-86, 197 S.E. at 590-94 (Barnhill, J., joined by Seawell, J., dissenting).
50. 216 N.C. 746, 765, 6 S.E.2d 854, 866 (1940) (invalidating legislation requiring the
licensing of dry cleaners).
51. See Little Pep Delmonico Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 252 N.C. 324, 327,
113 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1960) (affirming an injunction against the enforcement of ordinance
prohibiting maintenance of business signs in designated area of city), overruled by State v.
Jones, 305 N.C. 520, 530, 290 S.E.2d 675, 681 (1982); State v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 59-60, 108
S.E.2d 74, 78 (1959) (invalidating an ordinance requiring junkyard owner to erect fence for
aesthetic reasons), overruled by State v. Jones, 305 N.C. 520, 530, 290 S.E.2d 675, 681 (1982);
Roller v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 526, 96 S.E.2d 851, 859 (1957) (invalidating legislation requir-
ing the licensing of tile layers); State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 772, 51 S.E.2d 731, 736 (1949)
(invalidating regulations requiring the licensing of photographers by a trade board), overruling
State v. Lawrence, 213 N.C. 674, 197 S.E. 586 (1938); Palmer v. Smith, 299 N.C. 612, 616, 51
S.E.2d 8, 11-12 (1948) (invalidating legislation forbidding opticians from duplicating and re-
placing optical lenses without prescription).
52. 282 N.C. 542, 551, 193 S.E.2d 729, 736 (1973) (invalidating legislation prohibiting
hospital construction without a certificate of need).
53. 285 N.C. 467, 481, 206 S.E.2d 141, 151 (1974) (invalidating North Carolina Fair
Trade Act), overruling Eli Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939).
54. 320 N.C. 776, 778-79, 360 S.E.2d 783, 785-86 (1987) (invalidating ordinance that im-
posed licensing requirements on businesses purveying male or female "companionship"; the
ordinance was deemed overly broad and hence not rationally related to a substantial govern-
ment purpose).
55. McNeill v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552, 564, 398 S.E.2d 475, 482 (1990) (emphasis
added) (quoting State v. Whitaker, 228 N.C. 352, 360, 45 S.E.2d 860, 866 (1949)). A good
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governmental regulation violates the "law of the land" raises "a question
of degree and of reasonableness in relation to the public good likely to
result from it."56 A regulation's validity "depends on whether under all
the surrounding circumstances and particular facts of the case [it] is...
reasonably calculated to accomplish a purpose falling within the legiti-
mate scope of the police power, without burdening unduly the person or
corporation affected."' "T
These words mandate heightened judicial scrutiny, and they have
been so understood by the courts. They call for judicial scrutiny that
gives respectful consideration to the judgments of the legislature,58 but
not the kind of exorbitant deference to the political branches afforded by
the "mere rationality" standard that federal courts follow under the Due
Process Clause.5 9 They demand judicial review that courageously ques-
tions the real motivations underlying onerous legislation;' ° accordingly,
laws that have the curtailment of individual liberty as their purpose, and
not merely as their necessary incident, will not be tolerated.6 1 They re-
part of the formulation, of course, derives from United States Supreme Court decisions ren-
dered during the Lochner era. See, eg., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1933).
56. McNeill, 327 N.C. at 564, 398 S.E.2d at 481-82 (quoting State v. McCleary, 65 N.C.
App. 174, 180, 308 S.E.2d 883, 888 (1983), aff'd, 311 N.C. 397, 316 S.E.2d 870 (1984)); see
also Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs. of N. Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 478, 206
S.E.2d 141, 149 (1974) (speaking of judicial review under the "law of the land" clause as
requiring the court to ascertain the "location of the point of reasonable balance" between
liberty and governmental regulation).
57. McNeill, 327 N.C. at 565, 398 S.E.2d at 482 (emphasis added) (quoting City of Win-
ston-Salem v. Southern Ry., 248 N.C. 637, 642, 105 S.E.2d 37, 40 (1958)).
58. E.g., State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 448, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1989)
(stating that "great deference will be paid to acts of the legislature"); Hoke v. Henderson, 15
N.C. (1 Dev.) 1, 9 (1833) (noting that legislation should be set aside only when its unconstitu-
tionality is "plain"), overruled on other grounds by Mial v. Ellington, 134 N.C. 131, 46 S.E. 961
(1903).
59. E.g., State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 769-71, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734-36 (1949) (rejecting
justifications for legislation that would suffice under minimal "rational relationship" scrutiny
called for by the Fourteenth Amendment); State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 758-62, 6 S.E.2d 854,
862-65 (1940) (same; refusing to accord excessive deference to the legislative determination of
public interest; applying heightened scrutiny to economic legislation); Treants Enters., Inc. v.
Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 355, 350 S.E.2d 365, 372 (1986) (same; invalidating an
ordinance that "goes far beyond what is necessary to accomplish [its] objective"), affid, 320
N.C. 776, 777-80, 360 S.E.2d 783, 785-86 (1987).
60. See, eg., Roller v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 525, 96 S.E.2d 851, 859 (1957) (invalidating
an act requiring the licensing of tile layers, concluding that the act "has as its main and con-
trolling purpose not health, not safety, not morals, not welfare, but a tight control of tile
contracting in perpetuity by those already in the business"); Harris, 216 N.C. at 762, 6 S.E.2d
at 864-65 (invalidating legislation requiring licensing of dry cleaners, noting that the act's ten-
dency to favor certain individuals "raises a suspicion as to its public purpose" that "invites the
scrutiny of the Court as to the public nature of the objectives really pursued, which might
readily be found in a desire to limit the field of competition").
61. E.g., Roller, 245 N.C. at 525, 96 S.E.2d at 859 (noting that the state cannot, under the
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quire judicial review that insists on correspondingly greater showings of
governmental need as the intrusions upon individual liberty increase,62
culminating in the strictest of scrutiny when interests at the core of con-
stitutional liberty are infringed. 3 They demand searching judicial in-
quiry to ensure that the regulatory means chosen by government
promote the public ends sought without needless overinclusion or suspi-
cious underinclusion, thereby favoring the use of the least restrictive al-
ternative.64 In sum, the "law of the land" seeks to keep individual liberty
safe from the pluralist fray by demanding that infringements upon liberty
be justified-in the contemplative environment of judicial review-by
credible assertions of a genuine public need that bears a proportionate
relationship to the individual sacrifices entailed.
Although the judicial review contemplated by the "law of the land"
clause challenges judges, it has not proved unmanageable. To guide
them in their search for the "location of the point of reasonable bal-
ance,"65 and to minimize the influence of personalized preferences that
have no fair basis in the state's constitutional culture, North Carolina's
judges, like judges across the land, draw upon reliable external indicia of
societal norms in performing their "law of the land" calculus. Federal
constitutional decisions, while not conclusive, are quite persuasive,66 and
the opinions delivered by the courts of other states can also prove en-
guise of advancing a public purpose, legislate with the intent to interfere with protected
liberty).
62. E.g., In re Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 550, 193 S.E.2d 729, 735 (1973)
(noting that as deprivation of liberty increases, a "substantially greater likelihood of benefit to
the public" is necessary for regulatory measure to withstand attack under the "law of the
land" clause).
63. E.g., Texfli Indus., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 12-13, 269 S.E.2d 142, 149-
50 (1980) (acknowledging the need for strict scrutiny under the state constitution when funda-
mental rights are implicated); In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 102-04, 221 S.E.2d 307, 311-13 (1976)
(same).
64. Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 320 N.C. 776, 779, 360 S.E.2d 783, 786
(1987) (invalidating regulation that "encompasses an indefinitely large number of salutary en-
terprises, along with the meretricious adult-entertainment establishments at which county offi-
cials took aim"); State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 760, 6 S.E.2d 854, 864-65 (1940) (invalidating
legislation, noting that "it would be our duty to hold that the danger suggested might be met
with less drastic regulation"); see also Jones v. McDowell, 53 N.C. App. 434, 436-42, 281
S.E.2d 192, 194-97 (1981) (recognizing a mother's liberty interest in having her child keep her
surname; applying heightened scrutiny to gender-based classification; invalidating statute that
gave the natural father a conclusive right, upon legitimation, to have the child's name
changed).
65. Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs. of N. Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 478, 206
S.E.2d 141, 149 (1974).
66. McNeill v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552, 563, 398 S.E.2d 475, 481 (1990); Bulova
Watch, 285 N.C. at 474, 206 S.E.2d at 146; see supra note 35.
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lightening.67 North Carolina public policy, as evinced in its common
law" or its legislative enactments,69 certainly bears studied considera-
tion. Established local traditions can likewise provide valuable insights
into the state's enduring values.7" Of course, the state constitutional
precedents rendered by the North Carolina courts bear heavily on the
inquiry as well.
If the North Carolina Supreme Court gives fair measure to these
fundamental precepts of the "law of the land," it will have a hard time
denying meaningful state constitutional protection for a woman's liberty
interest in retaining authority over the decision whether to carry her
pregnancy to term. Today, even (or, perhaps, particularly) after Casey,
federal constitutional principles establish that the liberty interest at stake
is a heavy one not easily overcome, not even by any interest in safeguard-
ing pre-viable fetal life which a state might choose to assert.7 1 Upon
what conceivable premises could the North Carolina Supreme Court re-
fuse to admit at least that much, let alone more, under sections 1 and 19
of the North Carolina Constitution-provisions that promise a deep alle-
giance to personal liberty and which, it should be added, the courts have
been decidedly unwilling to interpret as affording less protection for indi-
vidual rights than the Due Process Clause provides? 72 And by what pos-
67. E.g., Bulova Watch, 285 N.C. at 479, 206 S.E.2d at 149 ("Obviously, the popularity or
non-popularity of legislation in other states does not determine its constitutionality in North
Carolina, but it does constitute some evidence as to the relation between the legislation and the
public's... welfare.").
68. E.g., London v. Headen, 76 N.C. 72, 74-75 (1877) (noting that common-law practices
permitting certain infringements upon liberty may validate governmental action under the
"law of the land"); Trustees of the Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58, 88 (1805) (same).
69. See, eg., State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 718-19, 724, 370 S.E.2d 553, 559, 562 (1988)
(relying upon public policy, established by legislation, to reaffirm state constitutional exclu-
sionary rule and to reject proposed "good faith exception" to the rule).
70. Id; see also Harry C. Martin, The State as a "Font of Individual Liberties'" North
Carolina Accepts the Challenge, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1749, 1751-52 (1992) (discussing the signifi-
cance of local practices, policies, and traditions to the decision in Carter).
71. As Justice Blackmun noted in Casey, the Court's reaffirmation of Roe v. Wade's essen-
tial holding-that a woman has a constitutional right to choose to have an abortion before
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State-refe-zts a "fervent view of
individual liberty and the force of stare decisis" and "should serve as a model for future Jus-
tices and a warning to all who have tried to turn th[e] Court into yet another political branch."
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2844, 2845 (1992) (Blackmun. J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
72. See Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs. of N. Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 477,
206 S.E.2d 141, 148 (1974) ("The term 'liberty,' as used in [the state constitution], is as exten-
sive as is the same term used in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States."); Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 351-52, 350 S.E.2d 365,
369 (1986) (interpreting state supreme court decisions as supporting the proposition that rights
protected under the "law of the land" clause must at least equal, but may exceed, those af-
forded by the Due Process Clause), aff'd, 320 N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783 (1987).
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sible reasoning might North Carolina, with its liberty-loving tradition of
heightened judicial review, differentiate itself from the growing number
of states that are finding room in their state constitutions for a woman's
right to choose?73 Answers to these questions are not readily apparent,
and it is doubtful they will be found in North Carolina's precedents, poli-
cies, or traditions.
Although the state judiciary has not passed on the validity of an
abortion restriction under the North Carolina Constitution, the relevant
state precedent that does exist is congenial to a well-defended right of
choice. An individual's interest in procreative liberty already has been
recognized as fundamental under the North Carolina Constitution,
prompting strict scrutiny of the state's involuntary sterilization legisla-
tion on its face74 and as applied.75 Moreover, an unwanted pregnancy
resulting from the negligent provision of contraceptive devices has been
held to constitute "a medical condition that gives rise to compensable
damages."76 While this holding rests on state tort law grounds, Justice
Harry Martin noted in concurrence that it is invited by "the right of
couples to practice contraception" that comprises one dimension of the
fundamental right to privacy secured by both the federal and, in Justice
Martin's view, the state constitution. 7 Interesting too is a 1900 holding
of the North Carolina Supreme Court that the Declaration of Rights pro-
tects an individual's right to be free from unduly burdensome forced
medical treatment,78 a ruling that takes on considerable significance
73. See cases cited supra note 11; see also Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers,
29 Cal. 3d 252, 285, 625 P.2d 779, 799, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 886 (1981) (recognizing state
constitutional protection of abortion rights pursuant to CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1, which is simi-
lar to N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1, but explicitly mentions a right to privacy); American Academy
of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 214 Cal. App. 3d 831, 843, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46, 52 (1989) (same);
In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191 (Fla. 1989) (invalidating parental consent statute under
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23, which explicitly articulates a "right to be let alone and [to be] free
from governmental intrusion into [one's] private life").
74. In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 102, 104, 221 S.E.2d 307, 311, 313 (1976) (recognizing a
fundamental right to privacy which embraces a right to abortion and to procreation, citing
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964); and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); upholding
compulsory sterilization legislation as facially valid under both federal and state constitutions
due to compelling state interest).
75. In re Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. 258, 268, 279-80, 304 S.E.2d 793, 800, 806 (1983) (rec-
ognizing a fundamental interest in procreation; holding that compulsory sterilization statute,
to be applied constitutionally, must be interpreted to require judicial findings which ensure
that sterilization occurs only when necessary and when it is the least drastic alternative), aff'd,
313 N.C. 421, 329 S.E.2d 630 (1985).
76. Jackson v. Bumgardner, 318 N.C. 172, 181, 347 S.E.2d 743, 748 (1986) (emphasis
omitted).
77. Id. at 187-88, 347 S.E.2d at 752 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78. State v. Hay, 126 N.C. 999, 1002, 35 S.E. 459, 461 (1900) (holding that compulsory
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when it is remembered that the unwanted childbearing that anti-abortion
laws seek to compel can be more dangerous to the health of the mother
than abortion itself.79 None of these authorities, of course, ineluctably
dictates a sweeping abortion right under the state constitution, but they
are of no help to those who would oppose one.
Similarly, North Carolina's public policy and relevant traditions
would seem to favor rather than militate against the recognition of signif-
icant abortion rights under the state constitution. As the North Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Carter80 demonstrates, established
practices, developed understandings, and settled expectations can shed
light on problems of state constitutional analysis, and those considera-
tions all illuminate a salient truth: A substantial number of North
Carolinians have come to regard the decision to seek and obtain an abor-
tion as a matter of personal right. For more than twenty years now,
North Carolinians have held to that belief and acted upon it. For all but
a curious few, the precise source of the right-the Due Process Clause,
the Equal Protection Clause, the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, or sec-
tions 1 and 19 of the Declaration of Rights-has been utterly inconse-
quential. It is the substance of the right, and the assurance that it will be
honored and protected by courts of law, that has mattered to the citi-
zenry. The repeated failure of legislative initiatives to impose abortion
restrictions81 and the consistent legislative resolve to fund abortions for
those in need of public assistance82 are indications that it matters greatly
vaccination regulations must permit exceptions for cases of danger to individual health in or-
der to pass muster under the state constitution).
79. As Walter Dellinger and Gene Sperling have noted:
A competent adult's decision to have an abortion in the early weeks is clearly a
decision to "refuse unwanted medical intrusion." Compelled childbirth is a major
medical event and far more dangerous than aborting an early pregnancy. Moreover,
a quarter of all pregnancies end with Cesarean section, a major medical procedure.
Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Retreat from Roe
v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 83, 96-97 (1989).
80. 322 N.C. 709, 718-19, 724, 370 S.E.2d 553, 559, 562 (1988) (refusing to alter the long-
established practice of excluding unconstitutionally seized evidence, the good faith of the of-
fending officers notwithstanding).
81. See Kanigel, supra note 3, at IA, 12A (discussing failed attempts to impose abortion
restrictions in North Carolina).
82. See Rachele Kanigel, Both Sides Expect Little Change in N.C. Abortion Laws, NEws
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 29, 1992, at 1A (noting that North Carolina remains "one
of 13 states-and the only one in the South-that uses public money to fund abortions for poor
women," although funding has been cut twice in recent years and restrictions apply). See
generally Starn v. Hunt, 66 N.C. App. 116, 310 S.E.2d 623 (1984) (setting aside challenge to
the State Abortion Fund); Stare v. State, 47 N.C. App. 209, 218-19, 267 S.E.2d 335, 342-43
(1980) (upholding use of state tax monies for the funding of elective abortions through the
State Abortion Fund), afld in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 302 N.C. 357, 275
S.E.2d 439 (1981) (approving and adopting the decision of the court of appeals).
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and matters still.
What is more, there is no credible indication that the one interest
that would clash irreconcilably with a woman's interest in choice-the
preservation of pre-viable fetal life-has been considered an important,
let alone compelling, concern of the State of North Carolina. The civil
cases recognizing a state interest in fetal life do not establish a compelling
interest in pre-viable fetal life,83 and neither, significantly, do the state's
criminal abortion laws. The statutes carefully distinguish between the
abortion of a fetus at any stage of gestational development8 4 and the
abortion of a fetus that is "quick." 85 It is well settled that the latter are
made criminal in an expression of the state's interest in fetal life,86
whereas the former are criminalized in furtherance of the state's interest
in the wellbeing of the mother." When North Carolina liberalized these
laws in 1967 to permit therapeutic abortions-assuming a position of na-
tional leadership in this regard-it surely did nothing to detract from this
conclusion.88 Viable fetuses, it might be added, are not deemed human
83. See DiDonato v. Workman, 320 N.C. 423, 431, 358 S.E.2d 489, 493 (1987) (holding
that Wrongful Death Act allows recovery for the death of a viable but unborn child, although
recoverable damages are limited); id. at 435-36, 358 S.E.2d at 496 (Martin, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing the significance of fact that fetus has reached viabil-
ity); Jackson v. Bumgardner, 318 N.C. 172, 181, 347 S.E.2d 743, 748 (1986) (allowing suit for
damages from negligent provision of contraceptive devices giving rise to unwanted pregnancy);
Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 109, 110-17, 337 S.E.2d 528, 532, 533-37 (1985) (deny-
ing action for "wrongful life," brought in the name of child, on ground that "life, even life with
severe defects, cannot be an injury in the legal sense"; denying action for "wrongful birth,"
brought on behalf of the parents, because of intractable practical problems associated with
such suits, but not on ground that abortions are to be avoided as a matter of public policy); see
also Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 89 N.C. App. 154, 159-61, 365
S.E.2d 909, 912-14 (1988) (noting that DiDonato extended a wrongful death remedy only to
the death of a viable fetus, and that the case did not answer the question whether injuries
inflicted upon the fetus before viability are recoverable), affid on other grounds, 327 N.C. 283,
309 S.E.2d 85 (1990).
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45 (1992) (criminalizing the use of drugs or instruments to
produce miscarriage or injure a pregnant woman).
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-44 (1992) (criminalizing the use of drugs or instruments to
destroy an unborn child). With regard to the quickening of a fetus: "[A] woman is not consid-
ered to be quick with child until she has herself felt the child alive and quick within her."
State v. Forte, 222 N.C. 537, 539, 23 S.E.2d 842, 843-44 (1943) (citation omitted). "Neither in
popular nor in scientific language is the embryo in the early stages called a human being.
Popularly it is regarded as such for some purposes, only after it has become 'quick,' which does
not occur until four or five months of pregnancy have elapsed." Id. (citation omitted).
86. State v. Jordon, 227 N.C. 579, 580,42 S.E.2d 674, 675 (1947) (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
44 "is designed to protect the life of a child in ventre sa mere"); accord State v. Hoover, 252
N.C. 133, 135, 113 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1960).
87. Jordon, 227 N.C. at 580, 42 S.E.2d at 675 (stating that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45 "is
primarily for the protection of the woman"); accord State v. Mitchner, 256 N.C. 620, 624, 124
S.E.2d 831, 834 (1962); Hoover, 252 N.C. at 135, 113 S.E.2d at 283.
88. For an excellent discussion of North Carolina's 1967 abortion reforms-which, along
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beings for purposes of the state's homicide laws. 9 Nor are they "per-
sons" entitled to constitutional protection under the Declaration of
Rights.90
Scrutiny under the "law of the land" clause must account for these
facts, and they suggest that the scale of North Carolina values leans
strongly in favor of a woman's liberty interest in choice.
III. CONCLUSION
The concept of constitutional liberty advanced by sections 1 and 19
of the North Carolina Constitution's Declaration of Rights brings a
broad range of individual interests under the protection of the state's or-
ganic law. In turn, the principles articulated under section 19's "law of
the land" clause dictate a prominent role for the state judiciary in the
protection of those individual interests. These principles compel the
courts to scrutinize governmental acts rigorously to ensure that liberty is
neither unduly restricted nor unjustifiably infringed.
Any sound discourse about civil liberties under the North Carolina
Constitution must begin with these two fundamental tenets. In years
past, they served to protect the average North Carolina workingman
from nettlesome governmental restrictions that impeded him in his quest
to secure his economic station in life.91 More recently, they have been
applied to free corporate entities from unnecessarily burdensome or
otherwise ill-conceived strictures.92 In times yet to come, they may be
expected to safeguard dimensions of liberty heretofore unforeseen as
needy of constitutional protection. Today, there is no reason to think
that they cannot secure the women of North Carolina art extensive state
constitutional right of choice.
with similar enactments in Colorado and California, constituted the vanguard of abortion lib-
eralization in the late 1960s-see H. Hugh Stevens, Jr., Comment, The New North Carolina
Abortion Statute, 46 N.C. L. REv. 585 (1968).
89. State v. Beale, 324 N.C. 87, 93, 376 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1989) ("Nothing in any of the statutes
or amendments shows a clear legislative intent to change the common law rule that the killing
of a viable but unborn child is not murder.").
90. Stain v. State, 47 N.C. App. 209, 214, 267 S.E.2d 335, 340 (1980) ("[Wle hold that a
fetus is not a 'person' within the meaning of Article I §§ 1 and 19 of the Constitution of North
Carolina."), affid in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 302 N.C. 357, 275 S.E.2d 439
(1981) (expressly approving and adopting decision of court of appeals relating to definition of
"person" under §§ I and 19).
91. See cases cited supra notes 50-51.
92. See cases cited supra notes 52-54.
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